Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Etta Jean Horn v. First Security Bank of Utah
Michael Peters, Peggy Peters cunningham, Kayleen
Jones and Janice Jones : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary A. Frank; Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard and Tate; Attorney for Appellant.
Heber Grant Ivins; Attorney for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Horn v. First Security Bank of Utah, No. 14161.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1273

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

/ Hi C f

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, deceased,
Appellant,

No. 14161

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. , a
National Banking Association, MICHAEL
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES,

RECEIVED
LAW Llf- ' "

Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

CUICHAM YQ'J"G U?::v.:""::7

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court
In and for Utah County
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Presiding
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE
Gary A. Frank
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Heber Grant Ivins
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84003

FILED
AUG 2.11975
Clerk. Supreme C o i r t f u ^ "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, deceased,
Appellant,
No. 14161

vs
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a
National Banking Association, MICHAEL
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES,
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court
In and for Utah County
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Presiding
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE
Gary A. Frank
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Heber Grant Ivins
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84003

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE --

•

1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I
BY THE PREMARRIAGE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE
INTER VIVOS TRUST THAT INCLUDED RETENTION
OF INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY,
BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, THAT CONSTITUTES
THE TRUST CORPUS, THE GRANTOR REMAINED
POSSESSED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE
OF A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE ESTATE IN SAID
REAL PROPERTY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE
SURVIVING WIDOW WAS VESTED WITH A ONETHIRD FEE SIMPLE DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE
POINT
II
INTEREST
IN AND TO SAID REAL PROPERTY.
THE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS
TRUST ON THE EVE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
THE GRANTOR AND THRESSA G. JONES CONSTITUTED A FRAUD ON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S
MARITAL RIGHTS.
POINT III
THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO THE
SUBJECT TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND DID NOT
OPERATE TO DEPRIVE THRESSA G. JONES OF
HER SUBSEQUENTLY VESTED DISTRIBUTIVE
SHARE INTEREST.
POINT IV
A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST RETAINING
ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP IN THE GRANTOR
MAY NOT DEFEAT THE DESIGNED STATUTORY
POLICY ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT A
SURVIVING SPOUSE.
CONCLUSION
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

16

18

24

28

AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Ackers vs. First National Bank of Topeka, 192 Kan.
319, 387 P. 2d 840

18,19

d a r k e n v s . Brown, 258 Iowa 18, 137 N.W. 2d 376
(1965)

15

Curtis et al. vs. Reilly et al., 188 Iowa 1217,
177 N.W. 535 (1920)

13

Free vs. Little, et al, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907)-

11

Gee vs. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac 680 (1921)
Hanke vs. Bjorgo, 152 N.W. 2d 262 (Iowa, 1967) --

9
-

15

Hilton vs. Sloan et al. 37 Utah 359, 108 Pac. 689 (1910)

9

Kelsey vs. Crowther, 7 Utah 519, 27 Pac. 695 (1891)

9

Land vs. Marshall, 426 S.W. 2d 841

--

---

21

Leach vs. Anderson, Utah 2d, 535 Pac. 2d 1941 (1975) --- 13,27,28
Martin vs. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. 2d 509

20

McNeill vs. McNeill, et al, 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988
(1922)----

10

Montgomery vs. Michaels, 54 111. 2d 532, 301 N.E.
2d 465 (1973) -

-

Newman vs. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 122.
A.L.R. 643 -

25
19,20,22

0'Conner vs. Halpin, 166 Iowa 101, 147 N.W. 185 (1914)--

14

Reynolds Estate, re, 90 Utah 415, 62 Pac. 2d 270 (1936)-

9,10,13

Sayre vs. Mohney et al, 30 Or. 238, 47 Pac. 197 (1896)--

12

Smith vs. Northern Trust Company, 322 111. App. 168,
54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944)
---

19

Thuet vs. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P. 2d 604

18

Wilson vs. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 443 (1907)

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES
Section 25-1-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)--

27

Section 74-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

24

Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

8,13,14

Section 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

11

TEXT
Comments, Edward A. Smith, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 151
I A Scott, Law of Trusts, Supplement, Section 57.5
(3d ed. 1967)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21,22,23
26,27

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix
of the Estate of THRESSA G.
JONES, deceased,
Appellant,
No. 14161

vs,
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a National Banking
Association, MICHAEL PETERS,
PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE
JONES,
Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant, as the administratrix of the Estate of
Thressa G. Jones, deceased, seeks a determination by this Court
that the revocable inter vivos trust created by Clarence T.
Jones on the eve of the marriage between the grantor and
Thressa G. Jones constituted a fraud on the marital rights of
Thressa G. Jones as the surviving spouse of the grantor or, in
the alternative, that the retention of all incidents of ownership by the grantor constituted possession during the marriage
of a legal or equitable estate in the real property that constituted a portion of the trust corpus so as to vest in the
surviving widow a one-third distributive fee simple interest
in said real property pursuant to Section 74-4-3, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding,
by Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and Judgment, under
date of May 22, 1975 (R. 141-152), held,
"That the estate of Thressa G. Jones, deceased,
has no interest in or to the real property conveyed by Clarence T. Jones, deceased, to the
defendant, First Security Bank N.A., and held
in trust by said defendant * * * ." (R. 152)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment of the
lower Court and a determination by this Court that Thressa G.
Jones, on the death of her husband, Clarence T. Jones, became
vested with a one-third in value fee simple interest in the
real property held by the trustee during the marriage between
the parties pursuant to the terms of the revocable inter vivos
trust.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March or April of 1961, Dr. Clarence T. Jones became
acquainted with Mr. Thomas C. Cuthbert, a trust officer for the
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., relative to the establishment
of a trust (T. 94). Pursuant to preliminary conversations,
Mr. Cuthbert corresponded to Dr. Jones by letter under date of
May 31, 1961 (Ex. 3) outlining various possibilities available
to Dr. Jones. Mr. Cuthbert recommended a revocable lifetime
trust that would:

(1) Retain the possession, right of use,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

and enjoyment of all non-income producing assets and tangible personal property in Dr. Jones during his lifetime; (2)
pay the income of the trust to Dr. Jones as directed by the
grantor; (3) reside in the grantor the right to obtain any
of the principal of the trust at any time; and (4) restrict
the sale, acquisition or investment of any trust asset
without the prior authorization and consent of Dr. Jones
(Ex. 3, p. 3). In summarizing this available alternative,
Mr. Cuthbert observed:
"From the foregoing, you can see that, except
for the transfer of bear legal title to the
assets, your control of your affairs would not
be substantially different from that which you
now have." (Ex. 3, p. 3) (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Cuthbert also noted:
n

You are also mindful of the possibility that
you may remarry sometime in the future and desire to insure that your child and grandchildren
be cared for in a manner which would insure that
a future wife could not disrupt the program."
(Ex. 3, p. 2)
The preliminary discussions and recommendations culminated in the execution between the parties of a Trust Agreement
under date of June 23, 1961, (R. 26-41), that required the trustee
to pay to Dr. Jones such amounts from the income or principal as
Dr. Jones should from time-to-time direct in writing and further
provided:
"IV.

RIGHTS RESERVED BY GRANTOR.

A. The grantor expressly reserves the right
at any time, and from time-to-time, to amend
this agreement in any of its provisions, or to
revoke the same in whole or in part, and to free
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

any or all of the Trust Estate from the terms of
this trust, and to withdraw all or any part of
the principal of the Trust Estate by written
notice to the Trustee of his election so to do,
and demand upon the Trustee to reassign, convey,
transfer or deliver [sic] to the Grantor the
property so specified.
•k i<

it

C. During the lifetime of the Grantor, the
Trustee shall make no sale or other disposition
of any property of the Trust Estate, and make
no investment of any money held in the Trust
Estate except as shall be designated in writing
by the Grantor.11 (R. 26, 27)
By Warranty Deed (Ex. 5) under date of July 14, 1961,
the grantor, Dr. Clarence T. Jones, transferred to the First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as trustee, all of the real property
then held by Dr. Jones (T. 109).
An example of the total retention of incidents of
ownership over the real property after the same had been transferred by the grantor to the trustee, is a Lease Agreement (Ex. 4)
under date of August 1, 1961, between the trustee and one James M.
Levie.

The agreement provided for a six year lease of one and

one-half to two acres of real property that had been previously
transferred to the trustee by the grantor and specifically set
forth this acknowledgment by the grantor:
"I, Clarence T. Jones, state that I am the
beneficial owner of the premises leased
herein, and the Seller referred to in Paragraph No. 3 of this agreement, and hereby
agree to all the terms and provisions hereof
insofar as they relate to or place any obligation upon me." (Ex. 4, p. 4)
4.
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Mr. Cuthbert, as the administrating trust officer,
conceded that the grantor retained the free power to revoke,
amend, or modify the trust agreement (T. 110, 111); that the
grantor could order and direct the trustee to return any and
all properties by so designating in writing (T. Ill); that any
disposition of the trust property, either by sale or lease,
required the trustee to gain the grantor's prior permission
(T. Ill); that investments of any proceeds or income by the
trustee required the grantor's prior permission (T. Ill); and,
that had the grantor elected and demanded the trustee by written
notice to reassign, convey, transfer or deliver to the grantor
any or all of the property in the trust estate, the trustee
would have done so (T. 113).
Mrs. Thressa G. Jones first became acquainted with
Dr. Clarence T. Jones at approximately the time the second
World War ended (T. 14). After Dr. Jones' daughter passed
away and certain grandchildren went to live with him, Dr. Jones
asked Mrs. Jones to move into Dr. Jones' residence in American
Fork, Utah, and assist the Doctor and his wife in taking care
of the grandchildren (T. 17). Mrs. Jones refused this request
(T. 17).
Dr. Jones' prior wife died in June of 1960 (T. 20)
and Dr. Jones again requested Mrs. Jones to move into his
residence (T. 21) and represented that if Mrs. Jones did so
and it was agreeable with Mrs. Jones, the two would get married
(T. 21). Mrs. Jones did move into the Doctor's residence in
July of 1960 (T. 23) and assisted the Doctor with the three
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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grandchildren (T. 21). In addition, Mrs. Jones performed the
housework, cooking and washing chores and also assisted the
Doctor in his veterinarian work (T. 22). After moving into
the residence, Mrs. Jones repeatedly inquired of Dr. Jones
as to when the marriage would take place.

Dr. Jones would

respond by saying that he had certain business to attend to
before the marriage.

(T. 30).

In the latter part of November, 1960, Etta Jean Horn,
the sole child of Thressa G. Jones, accompanied Dr. Jones on
a shopping trip in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 57). Dr. Jones
had asked Mrs. Horn to go with him as he planned to buy Mrs.
Jones an engagement and wedding ring (T. 58). A full wedding
ring set was purchased by Dr. Jones (T. 59) and Dr. Jones
gave Mrs. Jones the engagement ring either for Christmas of
1960 or for her birthday in January of 1961 (T. 59). Mrs.
Jones further testified that before her mother went to American
Fork to Dr. Jones1 residence, her mother assured her that
Dr. Jones had agreed that the two would be married within a
reasonable length of time (T. 66).
Mrs. Erma Uddy Smith testified that in January of
1961, Mrs. Smith and her husband were at the Jones1 residence
in American Fork, Utah, and that Mrs. Jones showed her the
engagement ring (T. 50). Mrs. Smith further testified that
at approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 11, 1961, she and her
husband accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Jones to Las Vegas, Nevada,
where Mr. and Mrs. Jones were married with Mr. and Mrs. Smith
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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acting as witnesses (T. 51).
By way of summary, Mrs. Jones initially moved into
the American Fork residence in July, 1960 (T. 23); became engaged to Dr. Jones on Christmas, 1960 or her birthday in
January, 1961 (T.59); Dr. Jones executed the trust agreement
June 23, 1961 (R. 26-41), executed the Warranty Deed on July 14,
1961 (Ex. 5) and the Lease Agreement on the 1st day of August,
1961 (Ex. 4); and, Dr. Jones and Thressa G. Jones were married
in Las Vegas, Nevada on the 11th day of November, 1961 (T. 51).
Mrs. Jones did not have any knowledge of the trust
prior to the marriage between the parties (T. 24) and even
after Mrs. Jones became aware of some arrangement between
Dr. Jones and the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., it was
not until after the Doctor's death on the 9th day of August,
1973, that Mrs. Jones discovered that the Doctor's real property holdings had been transferred to the trust (T. 35, 36).
The administrating trust officer, Mr. Cuthbert, acknowledged
that he did not meet Mrs. Jones at the bank offices until 1964
or 1965 (T. 108) and that Mrs. Jones never actively participated
in any conversations between Mr. Cuthbert and Dr. Jones regarding the establishment or management of the subject trust
(T. 108).
Clarence T. Jones died on the 9th day of August,
1973 (R. 5), leaving Mrs. Jones as his surviving spouse.

The

Trust Agreement was in full force and effect during the marriage between the parties and at the time of Dr. Jones' death.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mrs. Thressa G. Jones died intestate on the 25th
day of November, 1974, and on the 24th day of February, L975,
her sole surviving child, Mrs. Etta Jean Horn, was duly
appointed administratrix of the estate of Thressa G. Jones,
deceased.

Accordingly, Etta Jean Horn as the administratrix

of the estate of Thressa G. Jones, was substituted as the
party-plaintiff by order under date of March 31, 1975 (R. 113,
112) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY THE PREMARRIAGE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE
INTER VIVOS TRUST THAT INCLUDED RETENTION
OF INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY,
BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, THAT CONSTITUTE
THE TRUST CORPUS, THE GRANTOR REMAINED
POSSESSED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE
OF A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE ESTATE IN SAID
REAL PROPERTY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE
SURVIVING WIDOW WAS VESTED WITH A ONETHIRD DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE INTEREST IN AND
TO SAID REAL PROPERTY.
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) provides in part:
"One-third in value of all the legal or
equitable estates in real property possessed by the husband at any time during
the marriage, to which the wife has made
no relinquishment of her rights, shall be
set apart as her property in fee simple,
if she survives him * * * ." (Emphasis
added)
The nature of the distributive share interest reserved to a surviving widow by Section 74-4-3 Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) has been described as an inchoate
8.
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right that is contingent on the existence of a valid marriage
between the parties and the survival by the wife of the
husband.

If these two contingencies are satisfied, the in-

terest vests in the wife immediately on the death of the
husband.

As stated in Gee vs. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac.

680 (1921), at 58 Utah 452:
"While it is true that under our statute
dower by that name is abolished and the
wife takes one-third of her husbands real
estate in fee if she survive him, yet,
unless she does survive him, she has no
interest in his real estate. The interest
of the wife, although in fee, is, nevertheless, a mere inchoate interest, and
depends entirely upon the condition that
she survive her husband."
Even though the interest of the wife is inchoate
and vesting thereof dependent on the occurence of certain
contingencies, a husband may not extinguish this right by
contract, Kelsey vs. Crowther 7 Utah 519, 27 Pac. 695
(1891); further,
11

* * * A married man shall not devise
away from his wife more than two-thirds
in value of his legal or equitable estates
in real property without her consent in
writing.11 (Section 74-1-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)
In Hilton vs. Sloan et al. 37 Utah 359, 108 Pac.
689 (1910), the court stated at 37 Utah 378:
"We concede that the law favors the dower right,
and is tenacious in protecting the wifes right in
her husbands estate."
This protection is illustrated by In re Reynolds
Estate 90 Utah 415, 62 P.

2d 270 (1936), wherein it was
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determined that the surviving wife was entitled to one-third
in value of all real property possessed by the husband during
the course of the marriage whether the same was mortgaged
or free of a mortgage lien.

The Utah State Tax Commission

had petitioned the court to have the inheritance tax computed on the basis that the surviving widow's one-third
interest attached only to the difference between the value
of the land and the balance of the outstanding mortgage as
of the date of the husband1s death.

The court stated at

90 Utah 420:
"When she signs for accommodation purposes,
she relinquishes that one-third interest
only in case the mortgagee shall require
to resort to it for collection. If the
mortgage overlaps the one-third interest,
i.e., there is a necessity for resorting
to more than two-thirds of the proceeds
of the property, by her joint signing
she consents to that incursion on such
one-third of the proceeds.11
Even by the execution of the mortgage, the surviving wife's one-third interest could be invaded only if
the value of the remaining two-thirds was insufficient to
redeem the mortgage.
An attempt to contract by the husband without
the concurrence of the wife does not render the contract
void but the wife's distributive share interest will be
protected as an encumbrance on the property.

As stated

in McNeill vs. McNeill, et al. 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988
(1922), at 61 Utah 149:
10.
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If this was a case in which he (husband)
held legal title encumbered by an inchoate
right of dower even then he (husband)
should be required to convey the interest
he has in the lands subject to such right
of dower."
Once the distributive share interest has vested
in the surviving wife, she becomes a tenant in common as
to the real property subject only to a proper renunciation
of the husband's will pursuant to Section 74-4-4 Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).

As stated in Free vs. Little,

et al. 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907), 31 Utah 456:
"When the writing in question was executed,
as well as when this action was commenced
and the decree entered, Section 2826 giving
the wife one-third of the husband's interest
in real estate, whether legal or equitable,
possessed by him during the marriage, was
in full force and effect. This one-third
interest she holds as an inchoate right
during the life of the husband, and upon
his death it passes to her in fee simple.
* * * Alice S. Little, the wife, therefore,
claiming under the statutes, and no specific devise having been made of this real
estate she and her children, immediately
upon the death of the husband and father,
under the statutes of this state became
vested with the legal title as tenants
in common; the children as heirs holding
the title subject only to the claim of the
creditors of the father, while the wife,
in view of Section 2826, took her interest
in fee simple discharged from all such
claims. The husband could not effect the
rights of the wife either by an agreement
to sell, or by a conveyance made by him
alone. The wife and the children, in legal
effect, thus were and remained tenants in
common, she holding a one-third undivided
interest and the children the undivided
remainder until such time as the court
made distribution * * * ." (Emphasis
added)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The preliminary consideration in this proceeding
is whether a trust that reserves to the grantor the right
to direct the payment of income and principle to the grantor
during his lifetime, to amend or revoke the trust in whole
or in part, to free the trust corpus from the terms of
the trust, withdraw all or any part of the trust corpus,
designate in writing the investment, sale or other disposition of any of the trust corpus and otherwise resides
in the grantor complete dominion and control over the trust
res, is a legal or equitable estate in the real property
comprising a portion of the trust corpus.

If so, the

lower court must be reversed because these incidents of
ownership were possessed by the grantor during the marriage
to Mrs. Jones and until his death in August of 1973. In
Sayre vs. Mohney et al. 30 Or. 238, 47 Pac. 197 (1896),
the court stated at 47 Pac. 198:
"Formerly * * * every estate was legal,
in the proper acception of that term:
and in the contemplation of law, there
is and can be, but one estate, which
may properly be denominated !legal
estate.1 But the introduction of what
were known as 'uses,1 and the subsequent
origination of trusts, where one party
held the title, but upon some trust or
confidence for another, early led the
courts of chancery to take cognizant
of the rights of the beneficiary; and
thus there grew up a double ownership
of lands thus situated, the interests
which were cognizable as such only in
court of equity taking the name of
'equitable1 to distinguish them from
1
legal estates.' "
12.
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That portion of Section 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) hereinunder consideration, was
originally taken from the state of Iowa (In re Reynolds
Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 Pac. 2d 270 (1936) and it is a
familiar rule of statutory construction that the judicial
interpretation of the original statute by the state of Iowa
should be persuasively considered.
Section 335.

73 Am Jur 2d Statutes,

In Curtis et al. vs. Reilly et al., 188 Iowa

1217, 177 N.W. 535 (1920), the court stated at 177 N.W. 538:
"An 'equitable estate1 or interest in
land is, generally speaking, some definite
right or interest in the property such as
will furnish ground for equitable relief
against a trustee or against any person
or persons asserting a hostile right or
interest therein.11 (Emphasis added)
By the clear and unambiguous wording of the subject Trust
Agreement, the grantor was entitled the income therefrom, alter,
amend or revoke the trust, withdraw any or all of the trust corpus
from the operation of the trust and the sale, and investment
or other disposition of any of the trust property was subject
to the written designation and direction of the grantor.
The fact that the only power exercised by the grantor was
the receipt of income from the trust is immaterial.
stated by this Court in Leach vs. Anderson,
, 535 P.

2d 1241 (1975) at 535 P.

As

Utah 2d

2d at 1243:

"Whether the trust should be regarded as one
created for the use and benefit of the trustor,
is to be determined upon what she has a right
to take under its terms during her lifetime,
13.
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rather than upon what she has actually used
therefrom." (Emphasis added)
Had the trustee refused to reassign, convey, tranfer or
deliver any property to the grantor after written notice of the
grantors election, the trustee would have been in overt violation
of the expressed terms and conditions of the Trust Agreement and
appropriate legal proceedings would have been available to the
grantor to compel such action by the trustee.

The grantor did

retain such a right and interest in the subject real property that
equitable relief would have been available to the grantor had the
trustee not abided by the grantor's direction.

Such a protecta-

bel interest is clearly within the definition of !llegal or
equitable estate" within the context of Section 74-4-3 Utah
Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
The second consideration thus becomes the definition
of the word "possessed11 as the same is used in the subject
statute.
The word "possessed11 does not refer to physical
possession of the real property but, rather, refers to possession of the legal or equitable estate.

In 0TConner vs.

Halpin, 166 Iowa 101, 147 N.W. 185 (1914), the court considered
Section 3366 of the Iowa Code which provides:
"One-third in value of the legal or equitable
estate in real property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, which
have not been sold on the execution or other
judicial sale, and to which the wife had made
no relinquishment of her right, shall be set
apart as her property in fee simple, if she
survives him."
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The court determined that a daughter who had survived the testator father but predeceased her mother, was
vested with the remainder of the father's estate subject only
to the mother's life estate therein even though the daughter
was not entitled to physical possession or right of immediate
enjoyment of the real property.
The court stated at 147 N.W. 187:
"The word 'possessed,1 as used in Section
3366, relates to the estate in the property,
and not the property itself.11
In Clarken vs. Brown, 258 Iowa 18, 137 N.W. 2d 376
(1965) the testator devised a life estate with the remainder
to his statutory heirs.

The question was when the remainder

interest vested because two brothers had predeceased the life
estate and their surviving spouses claimed a distributive share
in each deceased brother's interest.

The court determined

that the deceased husbands were "possessed" of the remainder,
thus entitling their surviving widows to assert their distributive share interest.

See also Hanke vs. Bjorgo, 152 N.W.

2d 262 (Iowa, 1967).
As previously noted, the grantor in this proceeding
retained a legally and equitably protectable interest in and to
the real property that constituted a portion of the trust
corpus.

This retention constituted possession of a protect-

able legal and equitable estate.
The establishment of the trust prior to the marriage
of the parties
did not defeat appellant's distributive share
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interest in the real property that formed a portion of the
trust corpus because after the execution of the Trust Agreement the grantor possessed a legally and equitably protectable
estate and this possession continued throughout the course
of the marriage until the instant of the grantor's death.
The grantor never divested himself of this legal and equitable estate and appellant's distributive share interest in
and to the real property vested on the grantor's death.
POINT II
THE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST ON
THE EVE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE GRANTOR AND
THRESSA G. JONES CONSTITUTED A FRAUD ON THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE'S MARITAL RIGHTS.
The element of fraud required to set aside a conveyance
as a fraud on the marital rights of a surviving spouse is not the
same as that normally present in situations involving fraudulent
misrepresentation.

In Wilson vs. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac.

443 (1907), the court stated at 32 Utah 178:
"The general rule, undoubtedly, is that a
voluntary conveyance by either party to a
marriage contract of his or her real property
made without the knowledge of the other, and
on the eve of the marriage, is a fraud upon
the marital rights of such other, and that
such a conveyance will be treated as fraudulent and void as against the party surprised,
and his or her marital rights in the land so
conveyed will not be effected thereby.
(Daniher v. Daniher, 201 111. 489, 63 N.E.
239, and cases there cited.) It is also
there stated that some courts have held
that the purpose to deceive and defraud the
other prospective spouse is imputed to the
one who makes the attempted transfer and
conceals the fact till after the marriage,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and that it makes no difference in principal
whether actual fraud was intended or not, in
support of which is cited Ward v. Ward,
63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, 51 L.R.A.
858, 81 Am. St. Rep. 621, and Arnegaard v.
Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 75 N.W. 797, 41
L.R.A. 258. But it is also there stated
that the better rule is, where any such
voluntary conveyance is made without the
knowledge of the other of such contracting
parties, it presents a prima facie case of
fraud subject to be explained by the parties
interested, and the burden is on the grantee
to establish the validity of the deed, in
support of which is cited Fennessey v.
Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519, 2 S.W. 158, 4 Am. St.
Rep. 210; Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15
10 N.W. 276, 42 Am. Rep. 39; Champlin v.
Champlin, 16 R. I. 314, 15 Atl. 85."
The evidence is conclusive that the grantor, Dr.
Clarence T. Jones, purchased an engagement and wedding ring
set while accompanied by Mrs. Jones's daughter in late
November, 1960.

The engagement ring was given to Mrs. Jones

either during the holidays of 1960 or her birthday on January
2, 1961.

Prior to their marriage, the grantor had told Mrs.

Jones that he had a large farm and chicken ranch (T. 15);
that he had certain business to attend to before the marriage
(T. 30); and, that the creation of the trust and subsequent
transfer of real property thereto was accomplished by Dr.
Jones in contemplation of his forthcoming marriage to
Thressa G. Jones.
The evidence is clear and convincing that the
primary motivation for the establishment of the trust was to avoid
the statutory rights of the grantor's anticipated bride while
preserving in the grantor all of the incidents of ownership
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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enjoyed by Dr. Jones prior to the creation of the subject trust.
POINT III
THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO THE SUBJECT
TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND DID NOT OPERATE TO DEPRIVE THRESSA G. JONES OF HER SUBSEQUENTLY
VESTED DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE INTEREST.
A proper conveyance of a present interest in real
property may not be conditioned or subject to retention by
the grantor of a subsequent power of disposition during his
lifetime.

Where, as here, the grantor retains the absolute

power to make a disposition of the real property inconsistent
with the terms of the trust, it cannot be said that the
grantor in fact transferred anything.

In discussing the

validity of a deed that did not convey a present interest
because it did not become certain and effective until the
death of the grantor terminated his right of recall, the
court in Thuet vs. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P. 2d 604,
stated at 260 P. 2d 606:
M

In such case, the delivery would be a
mere pretense by which in fact the grantor
retained the ownership and power of disposition of the property during his lifetime
and sought by means of the deed to give
the property to the grantee only upon his
death. Hence such purported conveyance
would be colorable only and the transfer
not real, but illusory.M
This same rationale has been applied in instances involving revocable inter vivos trusts whether created before or
after a marriage.

In Ackers vs. First National Bank of Topeka,

192 Kan. 319, 387 P. 2d 840, the court concluded at 387 P. 2d 851:
18.
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* * * [t]hat the husband of a nonresident
wife may, by absolute sale, gift or other
transfer made in good faith during his lifetime, deprive the wife of her distributive
share. However, if the transfer is colorable
only and the husband retains the power of
revocation, it is felacious, elusive, and
deceiving, and will be considered as fraud
on the rights of the widow where she is
deprived of her distributive share.11
In Smith vs. Northern Trust Company, 322 111. App. 168,

54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944), the court held that the transfer to a trust,
although absolute in form, was illusory and void as to the rights
of the surviving widow.

The court cited Newman vs. Pore, 275 N.Y.

371, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 122 A.L.R. 643, wherein it was stated:
11 !

* * * [grantor] reserved the enjoyment of the
entire income as long as he should live, and
a right to revoke the trust at his will, and
in general the powers granted to the trustees
were in terms made 'subject to the settlor's
control during his life,1 and could be exercised 'in such manner only as the settlor shall
from time to time direct in writing.' Thus, by
the trust agreement which transferred to the
trustee the settlor's entire property, the
settlor reserved substantially the same rights
to enjoy and control the disposition of the
property as he previously had possessed, and
the inference is inescapable that the trust
agreements were executed by the settlor, as the
court has found, 'with the intention and for the
purpose of diminishing his estate and thereby
to reduce in amount the share' of his wife in
his estate upon his death and as a 'contrivance
to depirve * * * his widow of any right in and
to his property upon his death.' fl
The court further observed at 54 N.E. 2d 78:
"The test has been formulated in different
ways, but in most jurisdictions the test
applied is essentially the test of whether
the husband has in good faith divested himself of ownership of his property, or has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made an illusory transfer. In no jurisdiction has a transfer in trust been upheld
where the conveyance is intended only to
cover up the fact that the husband is retaining full control of the property though
in form he has parted with it.
(Emphasis
added)

• • • The court furthci * di sc nxssi i I < ini 1 c • I ted w 1 th appi o va] the
case of M a r t i n v s . M a r t i n , 282 Ky. 'ill, KS8 S.W. 2d 509 as
follows:
11

* -k * [tjhe surviving wife sought to reach
the unexpended part of approximately $30,000
deposited in several banks to the credit of
her deceased husband and by him transferred
to his sister several weeks before his marriage
with plaintiff; it appeared that the sister
expended no part of the money for her own
uses, but gave to her brother in his lifetime
such sums as he requested. The transfer was
held invalid as to the wife, and the court
said (419, 420 of 282 Ky., 514 of 138 S.W. 2 d ) :
!
It must be conceded that the decided weight
of authority is that an absolute bonafide
gift of personalty by a man contemplating
marriage with a woman, or even by a husband
during his life, is not a fraud on the marital
rights of the wife, or intended wife, even
though made with the intention and purpose of
depriving her of the right of sharing in
such property. [Citing cases.] This rule
is generally stated with the qualification
that if a transfer by a husband be colorable
merely, that is, a mere device by which the
husband does not part with absolute dominion
over the property, it will be considered a
fraud on the wife s marital rights, and it
is also generally held that a gift causa
mortis by a husband to a third person is a
fraud on the wife's marital rights, where
the gift is made to prevent her sharing
in the property, since the gift does not
take effect until the death of the donor 1 ."
(54 N.E. 2d at 78) (Emphasis added.)
The court concluded at 54 N.E. 2d 78:
M

Here the trust estate constituted all
of the husband's estate, except his pensions;
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he reserved for himself all of the income
from the trust and the right, in event of
illness or changed business conditions,
to request of the trustee enough of the
principal of the trust estate to maintain
him in the manner in which he was accustomed
to live; under the terms of the agreement
by which the settlor reserved the right to
revoke, alter or amend the trust agreement,
any request by the settlor for any part of
the principal would be equivalent to a
command, which the trustee could not
disobey except at the risk of having the
trust terminated; the trust agreement
expressly reserved to the settlor a veto
over the sale, disposition or investment
of trust assets by the trustee, and the
right to revoke, alter or amend the trust
agreement gave the settlor power to direct
and control any change in the securities
or any investment of trust funds; hence,
as in the case as heretofore discussed,
the transfer of title to the trustee,
although absolute in form, was merely
colorable and illusory. It was therefore
invalid as to plaintiff, who is entitled
to a widow s award and to one-third of the
estate of her deceased husband . » , .fl
(Emphasis addedT)
""
In Land vs. Marshall, -;.•••

^

a r.'\ . t ne court

adopted the proposition that, f! * * * [t]he failure of an
illusory trust need no I rust upon proof of an intent to defraud
the wife.n

(426 S..W, 2d at 848)

The court further stated the

true test as:
"Did the decedent, by the conveyance in his
lifetime, retain such a large interest in the
property that, at least as to his wife, his
inter vivos trust: was illnsorv?" (428 S.W.
2d at 848)
Tn Comments

Edward •. .i-.iiii/i, 44 Mich. I.

is stated at page 152:
21.
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"* r1

i

M

The courts have been very watchful, however,
to see that such transfers are made in
good faith. The doctrine of 'fraud on the
marital right 1 developed early. The rule
is usually stated that if a man conveys
his real property on the eve of marriage
with the intent of depriving his wife of
dower therein, she is entitled to dower as if
the deed had not been made, f!
The Comment further distinguished between trusts that
are avoided on the ground that they are illusory as seated in
Newman vs. Pore, supra, arid those avoi ded 01, ^i
an improper intent

\o

: ;•. . -1 g

the effect that they are "-TO Lorable.,f

distinction between the i.,-r ;;a;
term "colorable'

*!.d

absolute on its face, :m

idmittedlv "^rbitrar^" with the

;

-\di .:ai;i.n^?

The

' •

, <• . transfer wind.":, may be

which, actually,

a] 1 because, t ;v .i.., - -;^;,\ ••*. •, i .- h . •/

• .- ^.-: i* transfer at
a. . :

•. -V -* -i-.\ ' - .u(, the

parties intended that ownership ih ! •.. t>.. retained by * he donor.11
(At page 153)
In discussing Newman vs. Pore, supra, it i s stated:
"The court specifically rejected all. theories
of intent and fraud, and held that the only
sound test was whether the husband had in
good faith divested himself of ownership of
his property or had made an i1 lusory transfer.
-k *

*

"Evidently the court did not meati 'colorable 1
when it used the term 'illusory. 1
Nor did it
mean to include any element of bad motive
or intent to defraud the wife; though it
would seem that it was unfortunate to include
the phrase f in good faith 1 in its explanation
of the term. The test which the court was
laying down, at least if we are to interpret
it in the light of subsequent New York's
decisions was this: Pid the decedent, by
the conveyance in his lifetime, retain such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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transfer was illusory1 Or to use the phrase
of Mr. Justice Holmes, quoted by the court
from Leonard vs. Leonard, can we say that
T
from the technical point of view such a
conveyance does not take back all that it
gives, but practically it does?1" (At
pages 154, 155) (Emphasis added,)
The Comment concludes:
"To draw some conclusions from our study it
would seem first, that substantially all of
the recent case cite Newman v. Door and at
least consider the doctrine it sets forth.
A great majority of these follow 1t in
general principle; some give it a modified
application. (At page 159)
"What have we then which we can call a
basic principle that will give coordination
to our thinking and lend a degree of
harmony to the decisions? Only the bare
fundamental principle of Newman v. Dore that
the test is whether the settlor intended to
divest himself of his property or whether
he intended only to cover up the fact that
he was retaining full control, (Emphasis
added)
"You may feel that this conclusion merely
brings us back to our starting point; but
we must keep in mind that the intent by
which we test the transfers is not the 'intent
to defraud1 of the earlier decisions, but
an intent to retain, or part with, the
ownership of the property in question, If
arriving at the end of our discussion
with the rule of intent seems somewhat
dissappointing, we must remember that we
have not only rule of intent, but a rule of
intent with guideposts " (At page ] 62)
The totality of ilie evidence overwhelmingly estab-.
lishes thai f lie * j^ranLor. ; . ' larence T. Jones, created a
trust and transferred real property thereto but nothing really
happened.

By any sicii.driu .

..•;.,

\i-;/y, the tr list was

illusory to the extent that it attempted i:o deprive Thressa G.
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Jones oi" h e r m a r i t a l r i p j i l >

T h i s t l n r . < d " by I ho H,raulwr

s h o u l d not- be s a n c t i o n e d or condoned by ! h l s C o u r t .
POINT IV

A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST RETAINING ALL
INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP IN THE GRANTOR MAY NOT
DEFEAT THE DESIGNED STATUTORY POLICY ESTABLISHED
TO PR OTECT A SUR VIVING SPOUSE.
Section 74-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amend'H: , 'pro \/l cles in part:
" .* * * [t]hat a married man shall not devise
away from his wife more than two-thirds in
value of his legal or equitable estates in
real property without her consent in writing.11
The intestate succession statute prov 1 cles I i I par t:
11

If the decedent leaves a surviving husband
or wife, and only one child or the issue of
one child, in equal shares to the surviving
husband or wife, and child or issue of such
child; if the decedent leaves a surviving
husband or wife, and more than one child
living or one child living and the issue
of one or more deceased children, onethird to the surviving husband or wife,
and a remainder in equal shares to his
children and to the issue of any deceased
child by right of representation; but
if there is no child of the decedent living
at his death, the remainder goes to all
of his lineal descendants; and if all the
decedents are in the same degree of kindred
to the decedent, they share equally, otherwise they take by right of representation.
The share in the legal and equitable estates in real property of which an intestate
husband dies possessed, secured by this
section to his widow, shall not be additional to the interest to such estate
provided for her in Section 74-3-3~~ (744-5, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended)
(Emphasis added.)
24.
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The clear purpose of the statutory scheme above
noted is to provide for a surviving 'widow bv pi oh i bit ing <i
married vum ( ro

. i ing away from his wile more than two- •'

thirds of his estate* in real property and protecting the
widow in the event • < husband dies intk.',-.i;t

i"; ^ question

tlins becomes whether a husband through the guise of .. revocable inter vivos trust that retains all incidents ui
ownership created prior to hul in contemplation and on the
eve oi ' he marriage, may accomplish what he would otherwise
be statutorily prohibited'from al;tempting.
In Montgomery v. Michaels, V> Mi.

?d c>32, 301 N.E

2d 465 (lM/3), a surviving husband was allowed to :; laion a
one-third disM iuo ••/>-• :a - -

- s;e-

:

a'O

savings account

trust (Totten Trusts) created by aLs deceased wife.

The court

recognized 301 N.E. 2d 466:
"In Petralia (In re Estate of Petralia, 32
111. 2d 134, 204 N.E. 2d 1 (1965)) we held
that if the settlor is also the trustee
and retains complete control over the
account during his or her lifetime, such
a savings account is not different in substance from other revocable inter vivos
trusts, which this court has found to be
valid . . . ."
. The court lurtht; stated the issue to be:
11

* * -k [w]hether such a trust is valid for
every purpose, and particularly whether it
is effective to defeat a surviving spouse's
statutory share in the estate of his deceased
spouse, and his right to a widower's award ff
(301 N.E. 2d 466)
The court then discussed the expressed ;n:I.^ i-f
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viving spouse may anticipate from the others estate.
recognized that, "[sjwiuc: . i-.c

It was

suggest that the answer should

depei.'i ;:,- *. * he intent oi * ,,, ieceased spouse in creating
the trust "

('JO! N I-

re.Mvrii-;•. • * nn;

:

n

,e ',» : i

- -

However, it was further

: * ;. s and i nfl rmi ti es in dele rmi n i ag

the intent oi a decedent were readily apparent.

It was then

recognized that the settlor, during her lifetime:
11

* * * [r]etained absolute, unqualified
control over the bank accounts, and possessed and exercised all incidents of
complete ownership, including the right
to receive interest payable thereon and
withdraw the principal thereof." (301
N.E. 2d 467)
The court concluded at 30J. N.E„ 2d 467:
"Under these circumstances, the expressed
statutory policy of protecting a surviving
spouses1 statutory share i ii the estate
should prevail, regardless of the intent of
the deceased spouse in creating the savingsaccount trust.fI
In I A Scott, Law of Trusts , Supplement, Sectioi i 57 5
; JJ e<L i.''0 7) it is stated at pages 36, .< ;;
"The statutes enacted in most of the states
giving a forced share of the estate of the
deceased spouse to the surviving spouse
are quite recent. In New York, for example,
the statutes so providing was annexed In 1929,
The courts generally have taken a strict view
of the statutes, applying them only to
dispositions made by the will of the deceased
spouse. They were generally worded as allowing
the surviving spouse an election to take
against the will of the deceased spouse.
But it seems clear that the deceased spouse
should not be permitted to evade the policy
underlying the statutes by making dispositions
inter vivos in which he retained the advantages
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of ownership up to the time of his death, as
in the case of a revocable trust. Such a
disposition is n o t , as we have seen, invalid
as a testamentary disposition not complying
the requirements of the Statute of Wills.
But it is sufficiently like a testamentary
disposition so that it should be subject to
the rights of the surviving spouse. 1
(Emphasis added.)
Whether considered as an element in determining the
intent of the grantor or independently to render a IT-IS?
1 1 3 u s o ry , 11 ie m a i n tihre a d ty ing a. 1 ] < :> f 11 Ie d e < ; . • . * * *. •
T

r:he consideration of the nature and extent of the ;jower,

control arid dominion over the trust corpus retained by Lhe
grantor

W here the retention of control i s as complete as

in this Trust Agreement, iI: matters "1 ittle whether i:

e termed

evi d en c e o f t h e g r an t o r ' s f r audu 1 en t I i I t e i I t:, s u f f T T
and of itsel f to render the trust illusory or contrary \o

he

policy underlying the statutory scheme of providing for and
prot:ecti ng the int:erest of a sur v 1 ving spouse.An analogous situation was recently considered by
this Court in Leach vs. Anderson, supra, wherei n a spend•r.ii.'- trust was invalidated as against * i adgment creditor.
This Court recognized that Section z>-i-i: Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) j n recli ided

-< T ">-.;.,CG in tin ist for

the use of the trustor as against existing or subsequent
creditors and. stated at 535 P. 2d at 1243:
"That a trustor can deal generally with
his property as he desires we have no
doubt; and this includes placing it in
an irrevocable trust, beyond his own
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> T i.- x e

power to reclaim, or to sell or alienate
it; and may include a so-called 'spendthrift trust 1 provision to safeguard
against improvident dissipation thereof.
But as the trust may affect third parties,
the situation is different. The intent
and the effect of the statute is to prevent a person from using a trust as a
devise by which he can retain for himself
and enjoy substantially all of the advantages of ownership and at the same time
place it beyond the legitimate claims of
his creditors. (Emphasis added.)
Altho;i • : .. .r r i '.,.•!• \»

^r •. * ^ =;> u : - '. :

iS

;udLe,

the same does vesi :_n favor .-i the s ii vivin^ spouse I-M the
•u-.jf.h 01 the husband and the same policy that protects subsequent creditors from a debtor i nsiilati ng hi s assets while
enjoying the benefits thereof should also protect a surviving
s p i) u s e

II ie e n d i : e s i :i 11: s h o u 1 ci b e t:he s arne , to - w i t: that the

transfer of real property to a revocable inter vivos trust
wherein all of the incidents of ownership are retained by
the grantor will not: operate to defeat the statutorily
protected distributive share interest of the surviving
spouse,
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings
of Fact: and Conc 1 usIons of Law,

:

;•:1 " ] • *"":;A: \vcioP.L of the 1 ower

court are clearly erroneous and •••;•. support ed hv the record
herein

Accordingly, appellant is entitled tr

thereof with a direction from t h ^

••,.

. • i

a reversal
il^i\r: t,

entered in favor of appellant awarding appellant a fee simple
interest in one-third in value of" all real property lv-i.. ' v
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the trustee at any time from the creai ',, ,

: • •

the death of the trustor.

y
DATED this <#? day of August, .975.
Respectfully submitted,
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE
'*
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t^

^

VSS*
By y/&tj/<Tfo^azsO^
Gary/A. Frank
Attorneys for Appellant
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Salt Lake City, Utah 841H
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